Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive, and What Comes After

Earlier this month, the Ukrainian Army began a long-planned counter-offensive to take back the territory it had lost since Russia launched its invasion, almost sixteen months ago. To talk about the goals of the counter-offensive, and the challenges the Ukrainians are likely to face, I recently spoke by phone with Marina Miron, a postdoctoral researcher at the war-studies department, in King’s College London, who has been closely following the conflict. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed how the Russians have altered their military strategy, why reconstruction in the territory that Ukraine is able to win back will be such a challenge, and whether the Russians will instigate more counter-insurgency warfare in eastern Ukraine.

Can you describe in a big-picture sense what we know about this Ukrainian counter-offensive—how it’s going to play out and take shape?

Well, that’s the million-dollar question. In October, 2022, General Sergey Surovikin took charge of Russia’s so-called special military operation, and his forces controversially gave up part of the Kherson region. I think that’s when Russia understood that it needed to focus more on defense, and that that’s where it was lacking. Then, a couple of months later, Valery Gerasimov took over, and he has been building its echelon defense system, which is an old Soviet system going back to the Second World War. Basically, echelon defense means a layered defense, first with minefields, then foxholes, and so on, with the last one being artillery and mechanized infantry.

Meanwhile, Ukraine was getting new weapons deliveries, including Leopards, Challenger 2 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and so on, from Western countries. It was also being trained by NATO forces. So both sides were preparing. Ukraine had been pushing off its counter-offensive because of weather and because maybe there was hope that some sort of aircraft, such as fighter jets, would be delivered. So many discussions took place in the media about possible directions that Ukrainian forces could or would strike, and what would make sense, and so on, that it robbed the Ukrainians of the element of surprise. What we are seeing now is the Ukrainians essentially trying to practice deception by attacking in different spots. We see activity in the Belgorod Region. We have seen drone attacks, including in Moscow. We’re seeing Russian anti-government groups with links to the Ukrainian military-intelligence services operating on the fringes. What the Ukrainians have been trying to do is disorient the Russians.

It’s difficult to assess how it’s been going because the operation is very complex. It’s a combined-arms operation—so, motorized brigades, infantry, artillery and air power, and also engineers, the support. It requires coördination, it requires planning, and it requires them to know where the Russian defenses are at their weakest.

They have recently been probing around Zaporizhzhia, west of Donetsk, where they could get through Russian defenses, and the Ukrainians say that in some instances they have been successful. The Russians are very silent. And the Ukrainians pushed the Russians back on the flanks in Bakhmut. I think that we should expect the Ukrainians to be concentrating the main blow of the operation in the direction of Tokmak, and then possibly Melitopol, going all the way to the Sea of Azov in order to sever the land corridor to Crimea and cut the Russian forces in half.

Tokmak is a very important city because that’s a Russian logistical node. There is a railroad going to Russia, and so that’s probably one of the reasons why the Russians have reinforced their defenses there. They built their layered defenses right around that city, and I think it will be quite a challenge for the Ukrainians to get through.

To what degree are the Ukrainian plans about taking back territory that was lost, and to what degree are they about holding that territory in the long term? Obviously, the Ukrainians want to do both, but, at this stage of the operation, how much are they able to have both goals in mind?

That is exactly the problem, because, politically, the message has been, We will retake every single inch, we will push the Russians out. That doesn’t really take into account the fact that they will still need troops to put into practice the “clear, hold, and build” approach, or so-called Phase Four. I’m referring back to Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. operation in 2003. The toppling of Saddam Hussein—the military part—had gone well. But the reconstruction part and governance itself was lacking, and that created a power vacuum. This is something that I think will also be needed in Ukraine once the Ukrainian troops hold those territories. They will need to hold those territories, and they will have to rebuild those territories.

I can imagine that the Russians who rule those territories have done quite a lot of psychological operations to sway the population, which speaks Russian and which is ethnically closer to Russia, to basically not mind being ruled by Russia, just as in Crimea. The Ukrainian forces also have a problem in manpower and how many forces they can mobilize right now. In January, Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law that toughened penalties, which include jail time, for those who refuse to serve, or who are disobedient. We don’t know how many losses they’ve had, and it’s kept secret. I assume not much less than the Russians have had. My rough estimate is two hundred thousand Ukrainian losses.

The problem will be having enough troops capable of conducting offensive operations to force the Russians out, because right now we’re talking theoretically, as if the Russians will go back and somehow just stay on Russian territory and call it a day. It will be much more difficult, because the Russians will definitely do their best not to give up at least Crimea. They have something to lose, and they will make it as difficult for the Ukrainians as possible. Given the number of Ukrainian troops, and the training of those troops, I think it will be very difficult to fulfill the political aims Zelensky is promising. Remember, they have only nine brigades that have been recently trained by NATO.

So, you’re saying that even if the counter-offensive goes well, the long-term goal of holding this territory is going to be problematic and difficult?

I don’t think that the Ukrainian troops know exactly what those reconstruction operations entail. The Russians will still be trying to make it as difficult as possible for the Ukrainians. As I said, I don’t assume that the Russians will just disappear and that the Ukrainians will have the freedom to operate as they wish in order to hold those territories, in order to rebuild those territories. I think it will be quite difficult for them. This is a kind of task that I do not think that the Ukrainian Army has much experience in.

When you refer to the psychological effects that the Russian occupation has had on the people who’ve been living under it, and the Russians continuing to try to be active in contested territory, is the implication that Ukraine needs to worry about some sort of counter-insurgency campaign by the Russians?

Yes, this is what I’m implying. Since 2014, the Russians have been claiming that the population of the Donbas has been suffering from Ukrainian strikes. And there has been violence going on. This portion of the population—which, at least to my knowledge, is ironically not featured in any surveys done by Western organizations in terms of how they feel about the government and so on, because they simply don’t have access to this portion of the population—might be much more pro-Russian than one would think. The potential danger is that the liberation of the Donbas by the Ukrainians might not necessarily be perceived the same way by those who are living under Russian rule. And, again, the Russians are quite good at conducting psychological and information warfare to insure the allegiance of that population to Vladimir Putin.